Record 67% of Russians Back Peace Talks as Defense Budget Strains Economy in 2026

The polling shift is being driven by economic pressure as much as war fatigue. Russia's fiscal deficit widened to nearly 4 percent of GDP in 2025, and early 2026 data from the Russian Finance Ministry suggests the gap is growing further. Defense spending now consumes between 35 and 40 percent of Russia's federal budget — by some independent estimates, even higher when security agency budgets are included — leaving fewer resources for social programs, infrastructure, and the industrial subsidies that had historically cushioned economic shocks. Inflation in Russia has been running above 10 percent annually, with food prices up 16 percent year-over-year according to Rosstat data.

“Russia's fiscal deficit widened to nearly 4 percent of GDP in 2025, and early 2026 data from the Russian Finance Ministry suggests the gap is growing further.”

The National Wealth Fund, Russia's sovereign stabilization reserve, has been depleted from a pre-war peak of approximately $200 billion to around $45 billion — roughly three months of defense spending at current rates. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in a closed session of the Duma, leaked to the Meduza outlet, that "the structural constraints are real and will become more visible in the second half of 2026." Western sanctions have cut Russia off from roughly $300 billion in frozen assets held in European clearing systems, compounding the pressure.

Against this backdrop, the oil price windfall from the Iran war has been genuinely significant. Russia has earned an estimated $300 to $400 million per day in additional revenues since the Strait of Hormuz closure pushed Brent crude above $95 per barrel — a premium that has partially offset the budget strain. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced Wednesday that Russia is increasing oil supply deliveries to China and India to capture additional volume at elevated prices, a move designed to maximize revenue before any ceasefire in the Middle East ends the price spike.

Russia's military posture on the ground in Ukraine has not softened despite the polling data. The Institute for the Study of War formally declared Russia's spring-summer offensive underway on March 22, citing 619 combat engagements in four days across multiple fronts in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. On Wednesday, Russia's Ministry of Defense claimed control over the settlement of Shevyakovka in the Kharkiv region and reported advances along the Toretsk axis. Russia launched 153 Shahed-series drones at Ukrainian territory overnight, the heaviest barrage in two weeks, with 130 intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses.

The disconnect between public opinion and military policy is not unusual in authoritarian contexts, but Western analysts note it creates a structural vulnerability for the Putin government. Carnegie Endowment senior fellow Tatiana Stanovaya, writing in a policy paper published this week, argued that Russia's leadership is caught between the economic logic of negotiations and the political logic of maintaining a nationalist consensus that has been built on the premise of victory. "Putin cannot offer Russian society a deal that looks like defeat," Stanovaya wrote, "but the cost of not offering a deal is also rising faster than Moscow expected."

President Putin has shown no public inclination toward negotiations. At a ceremony Tuesday marking the 75th anniversary of the Soviet atomic bomb, Putin said Russia's nuclear deterrent "remains the cornerstone of our national security" and warned that any attempt to impose a solution on Russia from outside would be met with "appropriate response." The statement was widely read as directed at both Washington and Brussels.

The Russian public opinion shift matters for Western investors and businesses in ways that are not immediately obvious. European governments hold roughly €300 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets at Euroclear, the proceeds of which are being used to fund Ukraine's €90 billion EU loan. The legal framework for using these assets is being challenged in European courts, and the longer the war runs, the more complex the legal picture becomes. A negotiated settlement, even an imperfect one, would clarify that legal ambiguity faster than continued conflict.

For energy markets, the Russia-Ukraine dynamic intersects with the Iran conflict in a compounding way. Russia has a financial incentive to keep oil prices elevated for as long as possible — meaning Moscow is not a neutral actor in the Iran diplomatic process. Any scenario where Russia uses its Security Council veto or its intelligence-sharing relationship with Iran to extend the conflict deserves to be priced into risk models.

The 67 percent number represents something concrete: war fatigue inside Russia is real, measurable, and growing. Whether Putin's government acts on it — or suppresses it — will determine whether 2026 ends with negotiations or a deeper entrenchment on both sides.